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Covenant Violations and Dynamic Loan Contracting 
Introduction 
 Objective is to analyze the dynamic allocation of control rights in private debt contracts. 
 
Do lenders choose: 
1) covenants to monitor covenant violating borrowers? 
2) to shift the control rights in case of a recidivist? 
3) to insure against possible recidivists by more and stricter covenants? 
 
 Challenge is the complexity of loans contracts with covenants. A simplification is needed 
to compare those contracts in a meaningful way. 
 
 Relevant for uninformed lenders who may choose to monitor via covenants to reduce 
the agency cost/monitoring cost.  
Also relevant for borrowers who can select loans based on the “covenant looseness 
index”. 
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Contributions 
 Big question: How do lenders react to covenant violation in subsequent loans? 
 
 Why is it interesting: 
 
1) unique data that match: 
  SEC filins 
  LPC DealScan 
  CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
 
2) novel measure of covenant looseness. 
 
3) 55% of loans are affected by covenant violation. Relevant for a large share of the 
syndicated loan market. 
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Comments (1/6) 
1) The authors propose a measure of looseness: 
 
 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
𝑐−𝑥𝑡
𝜎𝑡−1
 
 
where c is the covenant threshold 
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Loan 1 Loan 2 
Violation? 
𝜎𝑡−1 
𝑥𝑡 
Comments (2/6) 
1) The authors propose a measure of looseness: 
 
 Is it an appropriate measure of covenant looseness? 
 
 Firm receives a shock in a Loan 1  
 => variable is forced out from the normal behavior 
 => covenant is violated 
 => its 𝜎𝑡−1 ↗ 
 => looseness index (Loan 2) ↘ 
 
 By design looseness takes lower values after violation. 
5 
Comments (3/6) 
1) The authors propose a measure of looseness: 
 
 
6 𝜎𝑡−1 
Violation 
Source: Compustat Annual 
Fundamentals Loan 2 Loan 1 
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Comments (4/6) 
1) The authors propose a measure of looseness: 
 
 
7 𝜎𝑡−1 
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Source: Compustat Annual 
Fundamentals Loan 2 Loan 1 
𝑥𝑡 = 0.98 
𝜎𝑡−1 = 0.22 
Looseness=2.35 
𝑥𝑡 =1.75 
𝜎𝑡−1 =0.55 
Looseness=2.25 
𝑐 = 3 
Comments (5/6) 
2) Robustness check: 
 
 Is a borrower punished for violating covenant or is it just the deteriorated credit 
quality? 
 
I violate a contract => conditions of my next loan become harsher due to: 
1) bad reputation 
2) higher credit risk 
 
 Assume the covenant violation is private information: 
1) If I maintain my relationship with the old lender I can be punished. 
2) If I switch I have a carte blanche with the new lender => the information 
effect goes away (compared to other new loans from other non-violating 
borrowers, i.e. who also switched). 
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Comments (6/6) 
3) What about clustering of covenant violation in time? How does this affects your results? 
 
4) It could be informative to look at the CDS behavior of the firms which violate covenants. 
 
5) p.13, §4: You refer to Fig2 but insert Fig1. 
 
6) p.14, §1: You talk about Fig3 without introducing it. 
 
7) P.15, §1: You talk about Tab4 but I think you mean Tab3. 
 
8) Tab3: Number of financial covenants = 2.02 
 Capital covenants = 0.56 
 Profitability covenants = 0.77 
 If they are exclusive and exhaustive groups then why their averages are nowhere near to 
2.02? 
 9 
Conclusions 
 Interesting paper with promising analysis the dynamic allocation of control rights and 
monitoring of private loan contracts. 
 
 Message: the loans that follow covenant violation include more covenants. 
 
 Contributions to: 
 literature which reduces dimensionality in loan covenants. 
 measurement of covenant looseness. 
 new perspective on covenants as a monitoring tools. 
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